Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) among financial institutions have been accelerating over the last two decades across the world. These waves of mergers and acquisitions in the banking industries raise important questions of whether mergers enhance the efficiency of surviving banks and contribute to the stabilization of the banking sector or just increase their market power in setting prices. A large number of studies attempt to resolve these questions by examining profitability, cost efficiency, and market performance of merger survivors. However, most of the existing studies examine the consolidation among the U.S. or European financial institutions, and little is known about the causes and consequences of financial consolidation outside the United States or Europe.
This chapter investigates the causes and consequences of the consolidation among Japanese banks. In Japan, a variety of banks have been consolidated since the 1990s when most banks suffered from a huge amount of nonperforming loans. The number of city banks, which operate nationwide and internationally, remained at thirteen during the 1980s but decreased almost by half to seven in 2005. While the number of first-tier regional banks, which operate in one or a few prefectures, virtually did not change over the last two decades (sixty-three in 1980 and sixty-four in 2005) , the number of second-tier regional banks, which are smaller than first-tier regional banks and operate mainly within a prefecture, decreased from seventy-one in 1980 to forty-eight in 2005. The number of cooperative (shinkin) banks, which are deposit-taking cooperatives operating within a prefecture and specializing in small-and medium-sized enterprise (SME) loans, also dropped from 462 in 1980 to 301 in 2005. 1 Using a rich data set of bank M&As in Japan, this chapter comprehensively analyzes the causes and consequences of bank mergers in the following ways. First, we analyze motives of bank mergers as well as their consequences. Using ex-ante bank characteristics, we investigate what type of a bank was more likely to be a target or an acquirer. Looking at the postmerger performance of a consolidated bank, we examine the effects of mergers on cost efficiency, profitability, and healthiness. Though many preceding studies focus on profitability and cost efficiency, it would be important to examine whether bank consolidation improved bank healthiness, if regulatory authorities promote bank consolidation to stabilize the banking system. We measure long-run postmerger performance based on accounting ratios rather than stock market returns. Though market returns are relatively free from measurement errors associated with accounting ratios, analyzing them would severely reduce the sample size, given that a small number of regional banks and no shinkin bank are publicly traded. In addition, accounting ratios enable us to analyze important components of performance (e.g., cost efficiency or market power).
2 Finally, our observations are comprehensive. We use data of major banks (i.e., city banks, trust banks, and long-term credit banks, which operate nationwide and internationally) and regional banks (i.e., first-tier regional banks and secondtier regional banks) over the period of fiscal years 1990 to 2004, and data of shinkin banks over the period of fiscal years 1990 to 2002. Our sample universe accounts for more than 80 percent share of deposits in all the depository institutions in Japan.
3 During the period of fiscal years 1990 to 2004, there were ten mergers by major banks, nine mergers by regional banks, and ninety-seven mergers and two transfers of business among shinkin banks, besides the mergers and transfer of business from failed banks. 4 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 briefly reviews the existing literature on bank mergers. Section 8.3 discusses the hypotheses on the motivations of bank mergers. Section 8.4 analyzes the M&A waves in Japan using aggregate data at the prefectural level. Section 8.5 describes our bank-level data set. Section 8.6 analyzes the motivation of bank mergers using premerger bank characteristics data. Section 8.7 presents the postmerger performance concerning profitability, market power, cost efficiency, healthiness, and portfolio. Section 8.8 concludes.
Literature Review
In the United States, a large number of commercial and savings banks were taken over by other depository institutions during the 1980s, especially after restrictions on intrastate and interstate banking were removed by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Recently, financial conglomerates have emerged through a series of M&As after restrictions on securities and insurance businesses by banks were lifted by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Service Modernization Act. In Europe, the emergence of the European Union in 1999 spurred consolidation of the financial services industry. In the crisis-hit Asian countries, foreign capital entry into the banking industry and government recapitalization promoted bank consolidation. These merger waves generated a vast literature on bank M&As, especially for U.S. and European banks. Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) review existing research concerning the causes and consequences of the consolidation of the financial services industry. They point out that the evidence is consistent with increases in market power, especially in the case of consolidation within the same market (in-market M&As); improvements in profit efficiency, and diversification of risks, but little or no cost efficiency improvement on average; and potential costs to the financial system from increases in systemic risk or expansion of the financial safety net.
As for the consolidation of banks in Japan, Okada (2005) studied ten megamergers among city banks during 1989 to 2000 and found that no improvement in X-inefficiency was observed but increases in cumulative excess stock returns and decreases in perceived default probability were found. Her results suggest that the motivation of megamergers was not to improve efficiency but to take advantage of the government's too-big-tofail policy. Yamori, Harimaya, and Kondo (2003) studied financial holding companies of regional banks and found that profit efficiency tended to increase when the market share in the region increased. Hosono, Sakai, and Tsuru (2006) analyzed the motives and consequences of credit corporative (shinkin) banks during the period of 1984 to 2002. 5 Their major findings are as follows. First, less profitable and cost efficient banks were more likely to be an acquirer and a target. Second, acquiring banks improved cost efficiency but still deteriorated their capital-to-asset ratio after consolidation. Finally, the consolidation of shinkin banks tended to improve profitability when the difference in the ex-ante profitability between acquiring banks and target banks were large. This chapter extends Hosono, Sakai, and Tsuru (2006) to cover most Japanese banks, including city banks, first-tier regional banks, second-tier regional banks, and shinkin banks. Compared with the preceding studies on the consolidation of Japanese banks, this chapter comprehensively analyzes the causes and consequences of bank mergers, as we mention in the introduction.
Hypotheses on the Motives of Bank Consolidation
This section reviews four major hypotheses on the motives of bank consolidation.
Improving Efficiency
As Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) point out, the primary motive for consolidation would be maximizing the value of shares owned by existing shareholders. Banks can maximize value either by increasing their efficiency or by increasing their market power in setting prices. Cost efficiency will be improved if an efficient bank spreads its superior managerial skills to an inefficient bank by acquiring the latter. Profitability will be enhanced by superior risk management.
The efficiency improvement hypothesis suggests that an efficient bank tends to acquire or purchase the business of an inefficient bank.
Strengthening Market Power
Market power can be strengthened if two or more banks operating in the same market are consolidated and, consequently, the market becomes more concentrated. Existing evidences from the U.S. bank M&As suggest that in-market M&As, that is, M&As of banks operating in the same market, may increase market power in setting prices.
According to this hypothesis, banks operating in the same region are more likely to be consolidated. Actually, most of the M&As among regional banks were conducted by banks operating in the same prefecture. Although all of the M&As among corporative (shinkin) banks were also conducted by banks operating in the same prefecture, this fact does not necessarily imply the market power motive but may simply reflect the regulatory restriction under which shinkin banks are allowed to operate only in a region that is usually defined within a prefecture.
Taking Advantage of a Too-Big-to-Fail Policy
The government policy directly or indirectly affects banks' M&A decisions. In particular, if regulatory authorities are expected to pursue a toobig-to-fail policy, weak banks have a strong incentive to be consolidated with each other because bank managers may want to keep their positions. Bank shareholders can also gain from the value of deposit insurance by surviving through mergers.
The government can promote bank consolidations among weak banks in some ways. First, the government can "arrange" consolidations, persuading (or sometimes forcing) relatively healthy banks to acquire unhealthy banks. Second, the government can give weak banks incentives to be consolidated with each other by establishing a scheme for recapitalizing consolidated banks.
In Japan, the government's "arrangements" were sometimes used before the 1980s when the financial markets were heavily regulated, and even in the first half of the 1990s, as is known as the "convoy system" (see the next section for details). The "market-based" consolidation through public money injection has become an alternative tool since 1998 when the banking crisis culminated and the government first recapitalized banks. When Japanese authorities recapitalized banks first in 1998, they did so toward major banks and the two largest regional banks. This fact may have fostered banks' anticipation for bailouts as long as they were large. Not only a large bank that operates nationwide, regional banks and corporative (shinkin) banks that are relatively large in a prefecture may also have anticipated bailouts because the Japanese regulatory authorities have often worried about the stability of regional financial systems, though the notion of a regional systemic risk had not been stipulated until the Deposit Insurance Act was revised in 2001 (Article 102).
6
If the government's anticipated too-big-to-fail policy and local market stabilization policy affect the decision of M&As, unhealthy banks or banks recapitalized by the government tend to be consolidated with each other.
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Managerial Empire Building
When corporate governance structures are weak, managers may be willing to acquire other banks for the purpose of empire building. They may gain personal financial and nonfinancial gains from consolidated institutions. Managerial hubris may also drive bank mergers (Bliss and Rosen 2001) .
Weak governance structures allow managers to spend on activities with scope for generating managerial private benefits, such as advertisement or entertainment expenditures (Yafeh and Yosha 2003) . Therefore, we may expect that banks that spend more on advertisement or entertainment tend to acquire other banks. In addition, if the managerial empire building motive drives M&As, then a consolidated bank cannot realize efficiency gains and is not willing to downsize or restructure the business. Managers of consolidated banks may increase advertisement expenditures for their private benefits.
Bank Merger Wave in Japan

Overview
A very small number of mergers occurred in the banking industry until the 1980s after World War II in Japan. The number of city banks, which operate nationwide and internationally, had been thirteen until 1990.
7 Mergers among regional banks, which operate mainly within a prefecture, also had been rare until the 1990s. Only one mutual bank (former second-tier regional bank) was acquired in the 1970s, and two mutual banks were acquired in the 1980s.
8 Mergers among credit corporative banks (shinkin) did not occur frequently, either. A small number of mergers until the 1980s reflected the government's so-called convoy system policy. 9 Under this policy, the regulatory authorities tried to stabilize the banking system by restricting competition among banks and bailing out failing banks. The government restricted banks' opening new branches and prohibited banks from engaging in securities business to control competition. When a weak bank fell into financial distress, the government requested a healthy bank to rescue the weak bank by injecting capital and sending directors. Healthy banks responded to the government's request because they could obtain the branch networks of the failing banks. Until the 1980s, M&As in the banking industry occurred only when the government requested healthy banks to acquire failing banks.
As financial liberalization made progress in the 1980s, the regulatory authorities found it more and more difficult to maintain the convoy system; healthy banks had little incentive or capability to rescue failing banks. In the early 1990s, stock prices and land prices fell sharply, which hit hard banks' asset quality. Risk-based capital requirements based on the Basel capital standards, introduced in fiscal year 1992, spurred consolidation of weak banks. Two mergers among city banks and three mergers among regional banks occurred in the first half of the 1990s (table 8.1). 10 Mergers among shinkin banks also occurred more frequently in the 1990s than before. Despite the introduction of the Basel capital standards, which were supposed to be rule-based regulations, financial regulations and supervisions by the Ministry of Finance were still affected by political pressure until a banking crisis occurred in 1997.
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10. Taiyo Kobe Bank was acquired by Mitsui Bank in 1990, and Saitama Bank was acquired by Kyowa Bank in 1991.
11. The government's resolutions of the failed "Jusen," nonbank finance companies that specialized in housing and real estate loans, were severely criticized by the public to the extent that the government rescued agricultural cooperatives that had invested in Jusen and had a strong political influence (see Hoshi and Kashyap 2001) . Sale of  Sale of  Sale of  Total  Merger  business  Total  Merger  business  Total  Merger  business   1990  22  1  0  132  0  0  451  3  0  1991  21  1  0  132  1  0  440  3  0  1992  21  0  0  130  1  1 (1)  435  4  0  1993  21  0  0  129  1  0  428  5  0 
Empirical Analysis
We first investigate the reasons for the recent merger wave using the M&A ratios, that is, the numbers of M&As divided by the total number of banks existing in the previous year, sorted by prefectures and bank types. The hypotheses concerning the motives of bank mergers discussed in section 8.3 have some implications concerning the time when and the space where M&A waves occur.
First, if M&As are driven by the motivation for improving efficiency, then merger waves result from shocks to an industry's economic, technological, or regulatory environment (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin 1996) . These shocks lead to industry reorganization. Analyzing the U.S. industrial merger waves in the 1980s and the 1990s, Harford (2005) found that operational performances measured by return on assets (ROA), sales growth, and others, were high prior to merger waves. He also found that higher market valuations relaxed financing constraints and made it easier to implement efficiency-driven M&As.
13 Following Harford (2005) , we use the average ROA for each bank type to capture the economic shocks to the industry's operating environment and the stock price index for the banking industry to capture the degree of financial constraints.
Second, if M&As are driven by the motivation for strengthening market power, banks operating in a less-concentrated and more competitive market are more willing to merge each other. Given that banks often compete within a region, we use the Herfindahl index for the deposits of regional banks and shinkin banks calculated for each prefecture.
14 Third, if M&As are driven by the motivation for taking advantage of a too-big-to-fail policy or a local market stabilization policy, then merger waves occur when the overall bank health is deteriorated. To capture the bank healthiness, we use the average capital-to-asset ratio for each bank type. The change in the stock price index for the banking industry also serves as a proxy for bank healthiness. Unlike the efficiency-motive hypothesis, the hypothesis concerning a too-big-to-fail policy suggests that a lower stock price triggers a bank merger. A low ROA may also lead to a merger under the too-big-to-fail-policy hypothesis because a low ROA deteriorates bank health.
Finally, if M&As are driven by the managerial motives for private benefits, then M&As are more likely to occur when and where the average expenditures for managerial private benefits such as advertisement expenditures or entertainment expenditures are high. While major banks and regional banks disclose advertisement expenditures, shinkin banks do not disclose the components of operational costs such as advertisement expenditures. Therefore, we cannot test the managerial motives hypothesis using the prefecture-level data here.
To control for regional shocks that affect banks' operating environment, financial constraints for M&As, and bank healthiness, we add the growth rate of prefectural gross domestic product (GDP) to the explanatory variables. 15 We also include a time dummy that takes the value of unity in and after fiscal year 1998 and zero before fiscal year 1997 to capture the regulatory changes stated in the previous section. The estimation period is from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 2004.
We estimate the following equation.
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13. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that stock market overvaluation promotes corporate managers to acquire relatively undervalued firms. This "behavioral" hypothesis also suggests that higher share prices cause merger waves. However, most of bank mergers in Japan have not been carried out through tender offers (take-over-bids) paying with stocks. So we do not discuss the possibility of the behavioral hypothesis in detail in this paper. For the empirical evidences of the "neoclassical" and "behavioral" hypothesis applied to Japanese nonfinancial firms, see Arikawa and Miyajima (2007) .
14. For the empirical evidences in Japan, see, for example, Kano and Tsutsui (2003 where indexes i, j, t, are a prefecture, a bank type, and a fiscal year, respectively. Average Performance is either the average ROA, the average capitalto-asset ratio calculated for each prefecture, or the change in the stock price index for the banking industry. We do not enter those three variables at a time because they are highly correlated. The Herfindahl Index is calculated based on the shares of deposits of regional and shinkin banks in a prefecture. Gross domestic product growth is the growth rate of the GDP of the prefecture where the head office locates. Because GDP growth is highly correlated with the stock price index, we do not enter them at the same time. We allow for the change in the coefficients of the bank performance variables after the crisis using the interaction term of the postcrisis dummy and the performance variables. Table 8 .2 reports the pooled-ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates of equation (1). Though we also estimate the model with a fixed or random prefectural effect, we report the pooled-OLS model based on the specification tests. First, when the average ROA is included as a performance measure (column [1]), the coefficients on ROA and its interaction term with the postcrisis dummy are both negative, though neither is significant. This is not consistent with the efficiency-driven hypothesis. Next, looking at the case where the average capital-to-asset ratio is used (column [2]), we see that the coefficients on the capital-to-asset ratio and its interaction term with the postcrisis dummy are both negative, though only the interaction term is significant. Finally, using the stock price index yields the result (column [3] ) that its coefficient is negative and significant, while its interaction term is positive but not significant. These results suggest that M&As tended to occur when the overall bank health was deteriorated, consistent with the too-big-to-fail or stabilization policy hypothesis. The coefficients on the Herfindahl index are negative and significant, regardless of the bank performance measures, suggesting that M&As tended to occur where the market was less concentrated, which is consistent with the market-power hypothesis. The coefficients on the GDP growth are significantly negative, which is again consistent with the too-big-to-fail or the financial stabilization policy hypothesis. Finally, the postcrisis dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that the regulatory changes triggered bank consolidations.
We will examine the relevance of the four hypotheses concerning the motives of M&As more closely using bank-level data in the following sections.
Bank-Level Data
The data source of financial statements of major banks and regional banks is Nikkei Financial Quest and that of shinkin banks is Financial Statements of Shinkin Banks in Japan, edited by Financial Book Consultants, Ltd. (Kinyu tosho konsarutanto sha). We identify an acquirer if the bank is legally surviving and a target if the bank has legally disappeared. We focus on the M&As of surviving banks by excluding from our data set the transfers of business from a failed bank because the latter is likely to be conducted for different motives and to have different consequences. 16 Our
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16. The transfer of business from a failed bank is identified if the deposit insurance made financial assistance (not recapitalization) to the bank that acquired or purchased the business of another bank. In Japan, financial holding companies were allowed to be built since 1998 when the Antimonopoly Act was revised. Some consolidated banks, especially major banks and large regional banks, took that opportunity to form a financial holding company that held insurance companies and nonbank financial companies as well since 2000. In the case of holding companies, we use the financial statements of the subsidiary banking companies. We do not use the stock prices of the financial holding companies because they reflect the performance of the other subsidiary companies as well. By using the financial statement of the subsidiary banking companies, we focus on the effects of mergers on the banking company. If there is a synergy effect from the security companies to the banking company within the same holding company, it is reflected by the financial statement of the banking company.
In the following analyses, we divide the sample banks into major banks (city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks), regional banks (firsttier regional banks and second-tier regional banks), and shinkin banks for the following reasons.
17 First, a shinkin bank is a cooperative depository institution specialized to small-and medium-sized enterprise (SME) finance. Therefore, the motives and consequences of M&As might be different from corporations like major banks and regional banks. Second, while major banks operate nationwide, regional banks and shinkin banks operate mainly within a prefecture. Most of the M&As among regional banks and shinkin banks were conducted by those banks that operated within the same prefecture (in-market merger). 18 The effects of mergers on market power might be different between major banks and regional or shinkin banks. Third, regulatory authorities' attitudes toward the nonperforming loan problems were different between major banks, on one hand, and regional and shinkin banks, on the other hand, in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. The government aimed at quickly reducing the nonperforming loans of major banks, while the government, afraid from the adverse effect of the write-off of nonperforming loans on SME finance, did not force regional and shinkin banks to reduce nonperforming loans quickly. Because the number of mergers by major banks and regional banks are small (ten and nine, respectively), separating them may yield relatively weak statistical results. However, we choose not to pool the major banks and regional banks because of the preceding reasons. Table 8 .3 shows the descriptive sample statistics of the bank and market characteristics that we use in the following analyses. We compare the bank characteristics variables among the acquirers, targets, and the average of each bank type: major banks, regional banks, and shinkin banks. The variables of the acquirers and the targets are as of one year before the mergers. Though we do not control for macroeconomic shocks across different years in table 8.3, it provides some useful information concerning the exante characteristics of acquires and targets.
19 First, targets and acquirers are less capitalized than the average of each bank type, and the differences in the risk-based capital ratios are significant in the case of the mergers of regional banks and shinkin banks. Second, the acquirer tends to be larger and the target tends to be smaller than the bank-type average, with the exception of the major banks' targets, though the differences in the logarithm of total assets are significant only in the case of shinkin banks. Finally, in the case of the M&As of shinkin banks, the targets' ROA are significantly lower than the average.
Figures 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 compare some characteristics of acquirers and targets as compared with the average of each bank type. We follow the following three-step process to draw the figures. First, observing the financial statements of the acquirer and the target for the five years preceding the merger, we combine these statements to create pro forma financial ratios for a hypothetical combined bank. To calculate hypothetical premerger financial ratios, we calculate the weighted average of the acquirer and the target, where the total assets of the acquirer and the target are used as a weight.
20 Second, we calculate the postmerger bank's financial ratios for the actual combined bank using its financial statements for five years after the merger. Third, we normalize both the premerger and postmerger financial ratios of the acquirer and the combined bank, respectively, by subtracting off the same-year, bank-type average.
Those banks whose data are available at the merger year and a premerger year are included in the sample here. Similarly, those banks whose data are available at the merger year and a postmerger year are included in the sample here. In figures 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3, simple averages of bank characteristics are depicted. Because we cannot compare accounting variables as of the year of M&As with the premerger or postmerger periods, we just Consolidation of Banks in Japan: Causes and Consequences 277 Notes: "Acquirer -All" and "Target -All" are calculated for each merger and acquisition (M&A) and only for the years when there are at least one M&A, while "All" is a simple average over the whole sample years. This is the reason why the differences between "Acquirer" (or "Target") and "All" do not coincide with "Acquirer -All" (or "Target -All"). Values are means (standard deviation). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * * * Significant at the 1 percent level. * * Significant at the 5 percent level.
connect a line for one year before M&As and one year after M&As. We look at the financial ratios that represent bank efficiency, market power, healthiness, and portfolio. Figure 8 .1 depicts the premerger and postmerger financial ratios of major banks, suggesting some interesting facts. First, target banks were less cost efficient than the average, and consolidated banks' ROA recovered slowly from an immediate deterioration after mergers. Second, consolidated banks increased the share of SME loans at least for the first three years after mergers. Third, the loan interest rate did not show a clear increasing tendency. Fourth, poorly capitalized banks tended to be an acquirer or a target, and consolidated banks suffered from decreasing capital ratios and increasing nonperforming loans at least for three to four years after mergers. 21 Finally, both acquirers and targets spent less on advertisement expenses before mergers, and consolidated banks continued to spend less on them after mergers than the average. Figure 8 .2 depicts the premerger and postmerger bank characteristics of regional banks. Like major banks, target banks were inefficient and poorly capitalized and profitability and efficiency once deteriorated and then slowly recovered after consolidation. The recovery of bank health, measured by capital ratios or nonperforming loans, after consolidation was also slow. Unlike major banks, consolidated banks decreased the share of loans to SMEs after mergers. Consolidated banks also decreased the advertisement expenses after mergers from a relatively high level before mergers. Figure 8 .3 shows the premerger and postmerger bank characteristics of shinkin banks. Like major banks and regional banks, target banks were inefficient and unhealthy. The recovery of profitability, cost efficiency, or healthiness could not be seen clearly after M&As. Acquirers and targets tended to focus on traditional loan business before M&As, and a consolidated bank tended to focus more on loan business, unlike major banks. A consolidated bank raised the loan interest rate after M&As.
In the following sections, we statistically examine how the premerger bank characteristics affected the M&A decision and how M&As changed bank performance.
Ex-Ante Characteristics and the Decision of Consolidation
If efficiency improvement motives drive consolidation, relatively profitable and efficient banks would tend to acquire relatively unprofitable and inefficient banks in order to spread superior expertise and management Consolidation of Banks in Japan: Causes and Consequences 279
21. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) defined by Bank Law are the sum of loans to failed borrowers, delinquent loans, loans delinquent for more than three months, and loans with the terms alleviated, all classified by each loan. The NPLs defined by the Financial Rehabilitation Law are all the claimable assets other than the normal ones whose debtors have no financial problems, classified by debtors' financial conditions. Banks are required to disclose both types of NPLs.
Fig. 8.1 Premerger and postmerger performances of major banks
Notes: Period zero designates the year when the bank merger occurred. Negative periods denote premerger years, and positive periods denote postmerger years. We connect the period (-1) value and period (ϩ1) value with a straight line. Weighted average denotes the hypothetical premerger combined bank, calculated as a weighted average of the acquirer and the target with their total assets being used as weights. skills over the target bank. On the other hand, if the government's too-bigto-fail policy or its motives of stabilizing the nationwide or local banking system drive consolidation, relatively unhealthy banks tend to be consolidated with each other. The government may also promote consolidations through recapitalization. If managerial private incentive for empire building is a major motive for mergers, banks that spend more on private benefits like advertisement expenditures are more likely to acquire other banks.
To analyze the motives for consolidation, we estimate the multinomial logit model: (2) P t,j ϭ for j ϭ 1,2,3, where P t,j is the probability of the bank's choosing the variable j at time t, with j being an acquirer, a target, or neither. The explanatory variable vector X t-1, j consists of bank profitability, efficiency, healthiness, governmental recapitalization, managerial private benefits, and size, as well as other control variables including market concentration and macroeconomic variables. We choose the ROA and the cost ratio for the efficiency variables and the capital-to-asset ratio and the nonperforming loans as a proportion of total loans as bank health measures. Nonperforming loans are available only after 1998. We also use the yearly change in the stock prices as bank health measures in the case of major banks, though the stock price data of individual banks are available only up to 2001 because since then major banks established holding companies whose subsidiaries include security companies and nonbanks as well. The governmental recapitalization is captured by a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank has been recapitalized that year or before and zero otherwise. As a measure of private benefits, we use advertisement expenses as a proportion of total cost. For the size variables, we use the logarithm of total assets and the exp(␤ЈX tϪ1, j ) ᎏᎏ growth rate of total assets. As a degree of market concentration, we use the Herfindahl index for regional banks and shinkin banks. Though major banks had head offices in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, or Sapporo and had some operational advantages over the areas where the head offices were located, they had branches and operated nationwide. This is why we do not use the prefectural Herfindahl index in the case of major banks. We control for the experience of M&As using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank has experienced an M&A before and zero otherwise. A bank that has experienced a M&A before may not want to carry out another M&A if it takes a long time to consolidate information systems and other business cultures. On the other hand, a bank that has experienced M&As may have knowledge and skills how to efficiently integrate different business practices. In that case, the M&A experience dummy has a positive effect on the probability of being an acquirer. Finally, to control for industrial or macroeconomic shocks, we add the change in the stock price index for the banking industry and the growth rate of GDP in the case of major banks and the growth rate of prefectural GDP in the case of regional and shinkin banks. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. We checked the correlation among the explanatory variables and found that ROA and the capital-to-asset ratio are strongly correlated for regional banks and shinkin banks (The correlation coefficients are 0.045, 0.853, and 0.615 for major banks, regional banks, and shinkin banks, respectively). To check the robustness, we also estimate equation (2) by entering ROA and the capital-to-asset ratio one by one into the explanatory variables. In addition, to take into consideration the possibility that it took more than one year to prepare for mergers, we also present the estimation results in the case of two-year lagged explanatory variables.
22
We estimate equation (2) for each bank type: major banks, regional banks, and shinkin banks. In addition to the full sample period (fiscal year 1990 to 2004), we divide the sample period into the precrisis period (fiscal year 1990 to 1997) and the postcrisis (fiscal year 1998 to 2004). The regulatory authorities did not intervene in bank mergers to rescue weak banks in the postcrisis period. Furthermore, their attitudes toward major banks' nonperforming loan problems became much more severe in the postcrisis period than in the precrisis period. It would be useful to see whether there would be a difference in the motives of bank mergers between the pre-and postcrisis periods.
8.6.1 Major Banks Table 8 .4 shows the estimation results for major banks. Column (1) shows the estimated coefficients and column (2) shows the estimated 286 Kaoru Hosono, Koji Sakai, and Kotaro Tsuru 22. Two-year lagged dependent variables may be appropriate in case a bank that is to be acquired by a relatively healthy bank in two years gambles on high-risk, high-return investment and finally deteriorates its balance sheet one year before mergers. This potential moral hazard problem was pointed out by Hiro Ito. 
Notes:
The probability of being an acquirer or a target as compared with being neither of them is estimated using the maximum-likelihood estimator. Standard errors are in parentheses. Independent variables are lagged one year for columns (1)- (8) and (11)- (14), while they are lagged two years for columns (9) and (10). * * * Significant at the 1 percent level. * * Significant at the 5 percent level. 
marginal effects for the full sample period. 23 Looking at the results of the acquirer equation, we see that the coefficient on the governmental capital injection dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that those major banks that had been recapitalized by the government were more likely to be consolidated. This result is consistent with the too-big-to-fail policy or stabilization policy hypothesis. It should be noted, however, that because all the major banks were recapitalized by the government in 1998, the coefficient on the governmental capital injection dummy may reflect any structural changes after 1998. The other bank characteristics variables and macroeconomic variables are not significant. Turning to the target equation, we see that the coefficient on the industrial stock price index is negative and significant, suggesting that a bank was more likely to be acquired when the equity values of the banking industry were deteriorated. These results are consistent with the too-big-to-fail policy or the stabilization policy hypothesis.
Entering ROA and the capital-to-asset ratio one by one into the explanatory variables, we obtain similar results (shown in columns [3] to [6]), though the coefficient on the governmental capital injection dummy is positive and significant in the target equation when only ROA is entered.
Columns (7) and (8) show the results when the changes in individual banks' stock prices are used as a bank health measure. We see that its coefficient is not significant in the acquirer or target equation. In the case of major banks, the overall worsening of bank health and the government's response to a systemic risk may have driven the merger waves rather than the individual bank health.
Using two-year lagged explanatory variables, we see (in columns [9] and [10]) that no explanatory variable is significant in the acquirer or the target equation, except for the capital-to-asset ratio in the target equation that is positive and significant. Though this result is not consistent with the toobig-to-fail policy hypothesis, the two-year lagged explanatory variable may not be suitable in the case of the mergers of major banks because every major bank seemed to hasten to choose the bank to consolidate or to be consolidated by, especially in the postcrisis period.
The subperiod estimation results are presented in columns (11) to (14). While no premerger variable is significant in the precrisis period, the coefficient on the cost ratio is positive and significant in the target equation in the postcrisis period. The fact that a less cost-efficient major bank tended to be acquired by other banks in the postcrisis period is consistent with the efficiency-improving hypothesis. Table 8 .5 shows the estimation results for regional banks. Looking at the full sample period estimation result, we see that the coefficients on the 
Regional Banks
Notes:
The probability of being an acquirer or a target as compared with being neither of them is estimated using the maximum-likelihood estimator. Standard errors are in parentheses. Independent variables are lagged one year for columns (1)- (6) and (9)-(12), while they are lagged two years for columns (7) and (8).
governmental capital injection dummy are positive and significant in both the acquirer and target equations, which supports the too-big-to-fail policy or stabilization policy hypothesis. In the target equation, the coefficient on the (logarithm of) asset is negative and significant, suggesting that a smaller regional bank was more likely to be a target. These results hold even if we enter ROA and capital-to-asset ratio one by one and if we use two-lagged explanatory variables (columns [3] to [8] ). Looking at the subsample period estimation results (columns [9] to [12]), we see that no premerger variable is significant in the precrisis period. On the other hand, in the postmerger period, the coefficient on ROA is positive and significant, and the coefficient on capital-to-asset ratio is negative and significant in the acquirer equation, while none is significant in the target equation. The result for the acquirer equation in the postcrisis period is consistent both with the efficiency-improving hypothesis and the too-big-to-fail policy or stabilization policy hypothesis. Table 8 .6 displays the estimation results for shinkin banks. We exclude advertisement expenses from the explanatory variables because shinkin banks do not disclose them. Looking at the full sample period estimation result of the acquirer equation (columns [1] and [2]), we see that the coefficients on the (logarithm of) asset and the M&A experience dummy are positive and significant. A larger shinkin bank is more likely to acquire another shinkin bank. In the target equation, the coefficient on ROA is positive and significant, and the coefficient on the cost ratio is negative and significant. Efficient shinkin banks tended to be a target, though the efficiency-improving hypothesis posits that efficient banks tend to be an acquirer. The coefficient on the capital-to-asset ratio is negative and significant, which is consistent with the too-big-to-fail or stabilization policy. The coefficient on the Herfindahl index is negative and significant, suggesting that a shinkin bank tends to be consolidated if it operates in a lessconcentrated market, which is consistent with the market power hypothesis. The coefficients on the (logarithm of) asset and the asset growth are both negative and significant, suggesting that a small or slowly growing shinkin bank tended to be a target.
Shinkin Banks
Most of these results still hold even if we enter ROA and the capital-toasset ratio separately (columns [3] to [6] ) or if we use two-year lagged explanatory variables (columns [7] and [8] ), though the coefficients on ROA and the capital-to-asset ratio become insignificant in the target equation when we enter them separately.
Though the subsample period estimation results yield similar results both in the premerger and postmerger periods, it is notable that the coefficient on the capital-to-asset ratio is negative and significant in the target equation only in the postcrisis period, suggesting that the too-big-to-fail or 1990-2002 1990-1997 1998-2002 
(8)
stabilization policy hypothesis is valid in the postcrisis period. The coefficient on the nonperforming loan ratio is also positive and significant in the target equation in the postcrisis period. The evidences on the effects of the premerger bank efficiency on the likelihood of being a target are mixed; the signs of the coefficients on ROA change from negative in the precrisis period to positive in the postcrisis period, and the coefficient on the cost ratio is negative and significant in the precrisis period. In sum, the efficiency-improving hypothesis seems to be valid in the case of the postcrisis period's consolidations among major banks and among regional banks. The market power hypothesis seems to be valid in the case of the consolidations among shinkin banks. The government's too-big-tofail or financial stabilization policy hypothesis also seems to be valid, especially in the case of the postcrisis period's consolidations. We find no evidence that supports the managerial empire-building hypothesis, though we cannot test that hypothesis in the case of the consolidations among shinkin banks due to the lack of suitable data.
Postmerger Performance
Background
Consolidation may have various effects on the consolidated bank's efficiency, market power, services provided, healthiness, and expenses for managerial private benefits.
First, consolidation may increase or decrease efficiency in various ways. A consolidated bank may be able to achieve a scale or scope economy. It may also improve X-efficiency by spreading superior acquirers' managerial skills over targets. On the other hand, it may take considerable time and costs to integrate different accounting and information systems, ways of doing business, and corporate cultures.
Second, consolidation may change the availability of loans and other financial services to small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), though such changes may not be intended either by acquirers or targets. If consolidation improves efficiency, a more efficient consolidated bank may be able to serve more customers, including SMEs. On the other hand, if a large bank finds it costly to process relationship-based information due to its organizational complexity, a consolidated bank may reduce loans to the SMEs that are informationally opaque (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 1999) . Consolidated banks may also increase or reduce other services, including fee businesses, according to their comparative advantages.
Third, consolidation may strengthen market power, enabling the consolidated bank to raise loan interest rates or lower deposit interest rates. This is likely to occur when acquirers and targets operate within the same local market (e.g., Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 1999) .
Fourth, consolidation may improve or deteriorate healthiness. Although regulators may promote consolidations by weak banks, it is not clear whether weak banks can restore healthiness just through consolidation. On one hand, a consolidated bank may gain from risk diversification through investing various areas and industries (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 1999) . In addition, an acquirer may apply its superior risk management skills to a target. However, if poorly-capitalized banks are consolidated, a consolidated bank must be highly profitable to fill in the initial shortage of capital and then to recover its capital to a normal level, unless it raises capital from outside. In addition, a consolidated bank may be exposed to the risk of an unproportionally large amount of loans to some specific large borrowers as compared with other banks as a result of the consolidation. 24 Finally, consolidation may increase or decrease expenses for the purpose of managerial private benefits, like advertisement expenses. If a bank acquires another bank for the purpose of increasing private benefits, a consolidated bank may increase expenses for private benefits. On the other hand, if a bank becomes a target due to its weak governance structures that allow large amounts of spending for private benefits, a consolidated bank may decrease such spending.
Methodology
We investigate the consequences of M&As by comparing the bank financial variables of premerger and postmerger periods. 25 From the viewpoint of existing shareholders (or members of shinkin banks) of acquirers, it is natural to compare premerger acquiring banks and postmerger consolidated banks. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of regulators that care about the banking system, it is useful to compare hypothetical premerger combined banks (that is, a weighted average of an acquirer and a target) and postmerger consolidated banks. We perform both comparisons.
Specifically, we first construct the financial ratios of the premerger hypothetical combined bank and the postmerger consolidated bank in the same way as we depicted in figures 8.1 through 8.3. Note that we normalize all the premerger and postmerger financial ratios by subtracting off the same-year, bank-type average. Next, we take the premerger average of the hypothetical combined bank over the five years before mergers. If the pre-
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Kaoru Hosono, Koji Sakai, and Kotaro Tsuru 24. The following example may be useful. Tokai Bank, Sanwa Bank, Fuji Bank, and Sumitomo Bank each had almost equal amounts (more than 500 billion yen) of loans outstanding to a large retail company, Daiei, which was in financial distress. It is said that UFJ Bank, formed from the consolidation of Tokai Bank and Sanwa Bank, was saddled with a distinguished amount (more than one trillion yen) of loans to Daiei for a long time after the consolidation.
25. The approach here is similar to Delong and Deyoung (2007) .
merger data are available for less than five years, we take the premerger average over the maximum years for which we can observe the data. Finally, we take the difference between the normalized premerger bank financial ratios and the normalized postmerger bank financial ratios. We look at the changes of the bank financial ratios for one to five years after mergers, respectively, though we report in tables 8.7, 8.8, and 8.9 only three and five years after mergers to save space. Focarelli and Panetta (2003) , Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) , and Rhoades (1998) show that a two-to three-year postmerger period is needed to determine if there are any postmerger gains. We also take the average of the postmerger financial ratios of the consolidated bank over the (at most) five years after mergers and take the difference between the premerger five-year average and the postmerger five-year average. We perform the t-test for the null hypothesis so that the difference between a normalized premerger financial ratio and a normalized postmerger financial ratio has mean zero. We also performed the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (z-statistic) for the null hypothesis so that the difference between them has median zero and obtained qualitatively similar results for most financial ratios. So we mainly report the t-test results in the following.
In this section, we select a sample where data on bank financial ratios are available for the merger year, one or more premerger years, and one or more postmerger years. The data set here is slightly different from that used in figures 8.1 through 8.3, where we choose sample banks whose data were available for the merger year and one or more premerger years but not necessarily available for postmerger years and sample banks whose data were available for the merger year and one or more postmerger years but not necessarily available for premerger years. Table 8 .7 shows the changes in the financial ratios of the consolidated major banks. The first column shows the changes from the hypothetical premerger combined bank for the full sample period.
Results
Major Banks
Looking at the efficiency variables, we see that the changes in ROA are negative three years after mergers and then turn to positive five years after mergers, though none of the changes is significant. The changes in the cost ratio are not significant, either, though consolidated banks seem to have decreased the cost ratio. It seems to take considerable time for a consolidated bank to realize cost savings or gain economies of scale or scope.
Market power variables show that the changes in the average deposit interest rate and the changes in the loan interest rate are not significant. A consolidated major bank did not seem to be able to exert market power in 1990-2004 1990-1997 1998-2004 1990-2004 Return of assets (ROA) ⌬ROA ( the deposit or loan market. This is not surprising, given that both acquiring major banks and target major banks operated nationwide. Business scope variables suggest that the share of SME loans significantly increases three years after mergers. One possible reason is that acquirers may have spread the skills necessary to make SME loans to targets. However, more a plausible reason is that when the government recapitalized banks, it required banks to increase SME loans. Because banks tended to be consolidated after the government recapitalization, consolidated banks increased SME loans. This result is different from U.S. bank merger Notes: The columns under the heading of "Premerger combined bank" denote the average change from the premerger hypothetical combined bank that is a weighted average of an acquirer and a target. The column under the heading of "Premerger acquirer" denotes the average changes from the premerger acquirer. ⌬X (t-year postmerger) is the difference of the variable X between t-year postmerger and the premerger average over five years (or less if data is not available). ⌬X (postmerger average) is the difference between X(postmerger average) and X(premerger average), where X(postmerger average) is the postmerger average of the variable X over five years (or less if data is not available) and X(premerger average) is the premerger average of the variable X over five years (or less if data not available). a Significant at the 1 percent level for the null hypothesis that ⌬X (or X ) has zero mean. b Significant at the 5 percent level for the null hypothesis that ⌬X (or X ) has zero mean. * * * Significant at the 1 percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis that ⌬X (or X ) has median zero. * * Significant at the 5 percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis that ⌬X (or X ) has median zero. 1990-2004 1990-1997 1998-2004 1990-2004 evidences, especially for the mergers of large banks (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 1999, 170) . The changes in fees and commissions and in the loanto-asset ratio are not significant. Bank health measures suggest that the changes in the capital-to-asset ratios are negative and significant three years after mergers and the changes in the risk-based Bank for International Settlements (BIS) capital ratios are also negative and significant (for t-statistics) for three years after mergers. The improvement of ROA after the merger was not quick or sufficient enough to offset the initial gap of the capital ratios between consolidated banks (i.e., acquirers and targets) and their peers. In addition, the changes in the nonperforming loan ratios, based either on Bank Law or the Financial Rehabilitation Act, are positive and significant three years after mergers. Consolidated banks may have applied a stricter standard to recognize nonperforming loans than before, resulting in the increase in disclosed nonperforming loans. It is well known that Japanese banks often manipulated the amounts of disclosed nonperforming loans so that they could satisfy the Basel capital standards before the Financial Rehabilitation Plan (i.e., Takenaka Plan) in 2002. In addition, a consolidated bank may have been exposed to the risk of an unproportionally large amount of loans to some specific large borrowers as a result of the consolidation. When those borrowers fell in financial distress, the consolidated bank may have continued to lend to them in order to avoid their failures, which would cause a sharp decrease in the bank's own capital.
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Finally, private benefit variables suggest that the change in the advertisement expenses as a proportion of total assets is not significant. The consolidated bank did not significantly increase advertisement expenses. In addition, the change in the average loan growth rate over the postmerger five years is significantly negative. The change in the average asset growth rate is also negative, though not significant. These results suggest that mergers triggered asset restructuring. Considering these results together, we may say that no evidence is found that supports the managerial empire building hypothesis.
The second and third columns of table 8.7 report the changes in the postmerger performance from the hypothesized premerger combined bank for the subperiods of the precrisis period (fiscal year 1990 to 1997) and the postcrisis period (fiscal year 1998 to 2004), respectively. In the premerger period, the change in the share of SME loans is significantly positive. On the other hand, in the postmerger period, the changes in the loan growth rate, the asset growth rate, and the capital ratio are significantly negative, and the change in the nonperforming loan ratio based on the Bank Law is significantly positive. The mergers in the postmerger crisis period seem to have been more directed to asset restructuring and yet to have resulted in a worse bank health, though the long-run effects of the mergers in the early 2000s may not have been realized yet.
The last column of table 8.7 shows the changes of the performance of consolidated banks from the premerger acquirer's level for the full sample period. Most of the changes from the premerger acquirer's level are qualitatively the same as the changes from the premerger hypothetical combined bank, except that the changes in the share of SME loans is not significant, reflecting the fact that the premerger acquirer's share of SME loans was higher than the average of major banks. Table 8 .8 shows the changes in the financial ratios of the consolidated regional banks. The first column shows the changes from the premerger hypothetical combined bank for the full sample period. Like major banks, the changes in ROA are negative, though not significant, three years after mergers and then turn to be positive and significant (for t-statistics) five years after mergers. This increase in ROA is caused partly by a strengthened market power of a consolidated bank in the loan market, which can be seen by the positive and significant change in the loan interest rate three and five years after mergers. Though the increase in the loan interest rate may reflect the change in the riskiness of the portfolio, the share of SME loans, which can be considered to be relatively risky, tended to decrease, if anything, rather than to increase after mergers. Furthermore, examining the correlations of the change in the loan interest rate with the Herfindahl Index and with the SME loan share, we find that the former is 0.571, while the latter is 0.243. A relatively high correlation between the change in the loan interest rate and the Herfindahl Index is consistent with the market power hypothesis. Though there is a possibility that consolidated banks implemented more stringent risk management, it would be difficult to charge higher loan rates without a strengthened market power. The changes in the capital-to-asset ratio are negative up to five years after mergers, though significant only in the five-year average after mergers. The improvement of ROA after the merger was too slow and small to offset the initial gap of the capital ratios between consolidated banks and their peers. The advertisement expenses as a proportion of total costs decrease significantly three and five years after mergers, which is not consistent with the managerial empire-building hypothesis.
Regional Banks
Dividing the sample period into the precrisis period and the postcrisis period (the second and third columns, respectively), we see that the changes in the capital-to-asset ratio are negative for both periods but significant only for the postcrisis period, while the change in the fees and commissions is positive and significant in the postcrisis period (for the z-statistics). 1990-2004 1990-1997 1998-2004 1990-2004 Return of assets (ROA) ⌬ROA (3-year postmerger) - The last column shows the changes of the performance of a consolidated bank from the premerger acquirer for the full sample period. The changes from the premerger acquirer are qualitatively the same as the changes from the premerger hypothetical combined bank except for the change in the advertisement expenses from the premerger acquirer, which is negative but not significant. Table 8 .9 shows the changes in the financial ratios of the consolidated shinkin banks for the full sample period. The first column shows the changes from the hypothetical premerger combined bank. Some financial ratios change in similar ways to those of major and regional banks. First, the changes in ROA are negative three years after mergers and then turn to positive, though not significant. Second, the changes in the loan interest rate are positive, though not significant. The correlation of the change in the loan interest with the change in the Herfindahl Index is positive (0.356) and significant, suggesting that the increase in the loan interest rate, if any, . a Significant at the 1 percent level for the null hypothesis that ⌬X (or X) has zero mean. b Significant at the 1 percent level for the null hypothesis that ⌬X (or X) has zero mean. * * Significant at the 5 percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis the ⌬X (or X) has median zero. 1990-2004 1990-1997 1998-2004 1990-2004 1990-2002 1990-1997 1998-2002 1990-2002 Return of assets (ROA may be caused by a strengthened market power. Third, the capital-to-asset ratio and the risk-based capital ratio (BIS) are both negative and significant for most of the postmerger years. Fourth, the changes in the asset growth rate are negative and significant five years after mergers. The second and third columns show the results for the precrisis and postcrisis periods, respectively. The changes in the capital-to-asset ratios and the asset growth rate are negative and significant in both periods, while the change in the risk-based capital ratio is negative in both periods but significant only in the postcrisis period.
Shinkin Banks
The last column shows the changes in the financial ratios of a consolidated bank from the premerger acquirer. The changes in the capital-toasset ratio, the risk-based capital ratio, and the asset growth rate are similar to the changes from the hypothetical combined bank, while the changes in the loan growth rates are negative and significant up to five years after M&As, and the change in the nonperforming loan ratio is positive and significant for the five-year postmerger average.
We may summarize the postmerger performance of consolidated banks as follows. First, consolidated banks tended to go through a decline in ROA at first and then to increase ROA about five years after mergers, though this recovery was significant only for the mergers of regional banks. It seems to take considerable time and cost to integrate different information systems and other business methods. Second, in the case of the M&As by regional banks or shinkin banks, consolidated banks tended to raise interest rates on loans, though this is significant only for the mergers by regional banks, suggesting that their market power was strengthened within the prefecture they operated in. This is consistent with the U.S. evidence, showing that in-market consolidation strengthens market power. Third, . a Significant at the 1 percent level for the null hypothesis that ⌬X (or X) has zero mean. b Significant at the 1 percent level for the null hypothesis that ⌬X (or X) has zero mean. * * * Significant at the 1 percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis the ⌬X (or X) has median zero. * * Significant at the 5 percent level for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis the ⌬X (or X) has median zero. 1990-2002 1990-1997 1998-2002 1990-2002 the changes in services provided are different by bank type and by period. Consolidated major banks tended to expand SME loans in the precrisis period, while consolidated regional banks tended to expand fees and commissions business in the postcrisis period. Fourth, consolidated banks did not recover bank health after mergers. The capital-to-asset ratio tended to decrease rather than to increase regardless of bank type. The recovery of ROA was too slow and small to fill in the initial gap of the capital-assetratio between consolidated banks and their peers. In addition, consolidated banks did not decrease nonperforming loans. Finally, consolidated banks tended to decelerate the loan growth rate and the asset growth rate, suggesting that consolidated banks tried to restructure assets and to downsize. Consolidated banks did not increase the advertisement expenses. The managerial empire-building hypothesis does not seem to be valid in Japan.
Conclusion
The recent waves of M&As in the banking industries across the world raise important questions of whether mergers enhance the efficiency of consolidated banks and contribute to the stabilization of the banking sector. We investigate the motives and consequences of the consolidation of banks in Japan during the period of fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 2004. In particular, we test the four hypotheses concerning the motives for bank mergers: efficiency improving, strengthening market power, taking advantage of a too-big-to-fail policy, and managerial empire building.
We first investigated the reasons for the recent merger wave using the aggregate data at the prefecture level. Our results suggest that M&As tended to occur when the overall bank health was deteriorated and where the market was less concentrated. These results are consistent with the too-big-tofail or stabilization policy hypothesis and the market power hypothesis, respectively.
Our analysis concerning the relationship between ex-ante bank characteristics and the decision of M&As suggests the following. First, in the postcrisis period (1998 to 2004) , efficient banks tended to acquire an inefficient bank except for the M&As of corporative (shinkin) banks. This finding is consistent with the efficiency-improving hypothesis. Second, unhealthy banks tended to be consolidated with each other, especially in the postcrisis period, which is consistent with the too-big-to-fail policy or stabilization policy hypothesis.
Our investigation of postmerger performance suggests the following. First, consolidated banks tended to go through a decline in ROA at first and then to increase ROA about five years after mergers, though these changes are not necessarily significant. Second, in-market consolidation enabled consolidated banks to raise the loan interest rate. Third, consolidated banks tended to decrease the capital-to-asset ratio and not to de-
